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Working in the same space

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Working in the Same Space

The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies
The Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

September 21 - 24, 2008

Introduction

Speakers:

Lieutenant Colonel Bob Baird
Deputy G-3 (Operations)
1st Marine Division
US Marines

Tom Baltazar
Director, Office of Military Affairs
US Agency for International Development (USAID)

Michael Marx
Senior Civil-Military Coordination Advisor
Civil-Military Coordination Section - New York
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Linda Poteat
Senior Program Manager for Disaster Response
Humanitarian Policy and Practice Unit
InterAction

Larry Sampler
Deputy Coordinator for Conflict Prevention and Strategic Communications
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)
US Department of State



Matthew Vaccaro, Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS), shares insights with S/CRS's Larry Sampler.

The military's increasing incursion into relief and development work has reshaped the notion of humanitarian space, the phrase coined by Rony Brauman of Médecins Sans Frontières to signify "that space of freedom in which we are free to evaluate needs, free to monitor the distribution and use of relief goods, and free to have a dialogue with people."[1] Humanitarian space is both a reality and an idea, embracing the physical geography stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) actors work in, as well as the concept of a safe place where conflict and disaster victims can receive aid in a manner devoid of any political agenda.[2]

Nonpolitical actors, including many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and a few intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and government civilian agencies, have traditionally served as the primary providers of vital relief, development, and infrastructure services, offering expertise and resources impartially to all who need them. As military forces have moved into insecure environments as various as Darfur, the Balkans, and Afghanistan, issues have arisen that field staff have been forced to deconflict on the ground. Chief among them: Which services should the military be involved with and which services should be the sole province of civilian organizations? How can S&R actors cooperate to reduce overlapping services, improve their effectiveness, and preserve the security of all organizations? When should actors share information, what should they share, and how can they do so in a manner that protects humanitarian principles? How should security be optimized? And what are the proper protocols for preserving the distinction between military and civilian actors and underscoring the differences between their motives and missions? Military personnel often struggle to understand the importance of humanitarian principles — "principles, schminciples" as one military participant in a high-level civil-military dialogue

> As military forces have moved into services traditionally administered by humanitarian actors, field staff have been forced to deconflict issues on the ground.

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ABOUT THIS EVENT

The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies hosted an interactive skills building workshop, *Working in the Same Space,* **September 21-24, 2008, in Seaside, California. The workshop convened 36 S&R actors to discuss their organizational perspectives and differences, explore the issues of shared humanitarian space, enhance their negotiation and mediation skills, and deepen their professional networks. Representatives from nongovernmental organizations, inter-governmental organizations, government civilian agencies, and the armed forces attended the workshop.**

www.csrs-nps.org

Defining Civil-Military Cooperation

Speaker:

Linda Poteat
InterAction

Linda Poteat discussed the process of developing the *Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments.* Beginning in 2005, senior NGO, military, and government civilian agency leaders met over the course of two and a half years to discuss and develop a basic framework for interacting in the field. The impetus for this initiative? The need to deconflict issues that were arising with the military's increasing incursion into relief and development work, such as military forces performing relief activities in civilian clothes or instantly classifying security information and thus rendering it inaccessible to civilians. The United States Institute of Peace facilitated the dialogue and negotiation, which was contentious at times, as both sides shared their missions and priorities. The document provides guidance on how military and NGO personnel should behave, interact, and share information in the field, as well as how organizations can serve as bridges between the two communities.

> "No single organization can speak for the entire NGO community. There is no uniformity in our approach or perspectives."
>
> — ***Linda Poteat, InterAction***

Four panelists representing the US military, NGO, IGO, and government civilian agency communities presented their perspectives.

While some NGOs and military representatives perpetuate polarizing stereotypes of each other, many NGOs are willing to cooperate with military forces on issues that make sense, such as sharing security information. "No single organization can speak for the entire NGO community. There is no uniformity in our approach or our perspectives. You have NGOs that don't want to interact with the military and those that take funding from the Defense Department. Most of us fall in between,"

(Continued on page 3)

[1, 2] Wagner, Johanna Grombach. January 2006. "An IHL/ICRC Perspective on 'Humanitarian Space.'" *Humanitarian Exchange Magazine.* Issue 32. Available at http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2765.

Event Speakers

Lieutenant Colonel Bob Baird, Deputy G-3 (Operations), 1st Marine Division, US Marine Corps

Tom Baltazar, Director, Office of Military Affairs, USAID

Reverend Byron Bland, Associate Director, Center on International Conflict and Negotiation, Stanford University

Dr. Susan Hocevar, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School

Cameron Hunter, Executive Director, Global Majority

Michael Marx, Senior Civil-Military Coordination Advisor, Civil-Military Coordination Section – New York, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Linda Poteat, Senior Program Manager for Disaster Response, Humanitarian Policy and Practice Unit, InterAction

Larry Sampler, Deputy Coordinator for Conflict Prevention and Strategic Communications, S/CRS, US Department of State

Carl Siebentritt, Director, Active Response Component, S/CRS, US Department of State

Nick Tomb, Program Coordinator, CSRS

Matthew Vaccaro, Program Director, CSRS

The UN's Perspective on Civil-Military Coordination

Speaker:

Michael Marx
OCHA

S&R organizations conducting humanitarian operations are working in a complex environment characterized by a proliferation of actors, a competitive funding environment, and increased public scrutiny, said **Michael Marx**. In addition the United Nations' (UN) role is changing from an implementer to an overseer, as it sets standards and facilitates cooperation.

The UN's authority was directly challenged when the US decided to invade Iraq in 2003 without receiving a Security Council resolution. As a consequence, the cooperation and coordination between the UN and US military has been difficult, to such a degree that UN humanitarian agencies initially refused to interact with US forces and the USAID/OFDA Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) operating in Iraq.

OCHA's Michael Marx described the UN's work to improve and integrate S&R actors' humanitarian response efforts.

Marx acknowledged that there is increasing humanitarian acceptance of an appropriate military role in relief operations, particularly in disaster response. However, efforts need to be coordinated to ensure that NGOs' humanitarian principles are protected and that organizations are not executing competing or redundant work. OCHA provides guidelines to help relief actors understand their roles and leverage military resources, when appropriate.

So where does the UN see a role for military involvement in humanitarian response? The military can play a vital, behind-the-scenes role in providing indirect assistance or infrastructure support, both of which benefit affected populations. However, the military should leave direct assistance, the face-to-face distribution of goods and services, to civilian aid organizations.

The UN uses a wide array of coordination and response tools to meet the needs of the world's 25 million conflict victims, as well as the survivors of natural disasters.

UN Coordination and Response Tools for Crises and Natural Disasters

- The cluster framework — A new approach that assigns a lead organization to critical activities to coordinate work and ensure adequate capacity.
- The Central Register of Disaster Management Capacities — An online resource of member states' disaster response resources. As this database is difficult to maintain, OCHA often assists in expediting requests from countries in need.
- UN Disaster and Coordination Teams — A network of emergency managers that can be mobilized to go to a disaster site, conduct assessments, and set up coordination structures within 24 hours.
- Highly trained personnel — Search and rescue teams and environmental experts, among others.
- Standby partners — Employees of commercial companies who can be deployed within 72 hours to set up cell phone access in disaster spots.
- Relief supplies — Stockpiled for rapid global distribution.
- Information tools — ReliefWeb, the global online resource for humanitarian information on complex emergencies and natural disasters. ReliefWeb's resources include country updates, an aids flows database, map center, and a humanitarian directory. The site is available online at www.reliefweb.int.

The UN's cluster framework was designed to improve the predictability and accountability of humanitarian response by assigning accountability for critical activities — such as nutrition, water and sanitation, protection, and logistics — to a single agency or agency team. It was first implemented to coordinate the response to the Pakistan earthquake of 2005. Each cluster lead is responsible for coordinating the work of multiple contributing organizations. The framework is implemented for major new emergencies and ongoing emergencies when a humanitarian coordinator has been appointed and the crisis requires response from a wide range of actors. In addition, leads must work to implement standards, build capacity, and improve operational support across their service area.

The UN also offers different funding tools to help meet time-critical disaster response needs, including Flash Appeals, emergency cash grants, and the Central Emergency Response Fund, a standby fund that can quickly disperse monies for new or underfunded crises. Through the Consolidated Appeals Process, NGOs band together to raise funds for specific programs in a country or region and plan and execute cooperative initiatives.••

Learning Objectives

The event was designed to help S&R practitioners achieve the following learning objectives:

- Enhance their understanding of other S&R communities while expanding their professional networks
- Expand their repertoire of communication, negotiation, and mediation skills to strengthen interaction with other S&R actors
- Develop their capacity to build trust, identify shared objectives, and promote collaboration
- Explore emerging concepts and initiatives from the various S&R communities

Civil-Military Cooperation continued from page 1

said Poteat. What's critical is that these interactions protect NGOs' humanitarian principles, so that NGOs aren't associated with the military. Several NGO representatives stated that many host governments were suspicious of NGO activities and looked for reasons to sabotage their work. "When you are on the ground, your job is to maintain the respect of the local population," said an NGO representative. "People are often scared and angry, and our job is to help them become empowered." Added another, "When an NGO arrives in a country like Sudan or Chad, everyone assumes that you work for the CIA. So you start from a deficit. Calling an NGO a force multiplier can add to that deficit. It could make the host government revoke your certification and set back your programs by six months." One NGO worker cited the Colombian government's unauthorized use of the Red Cross logo on helicopters involved in rescuing Ingrid Betancourt as the most flagrant recent violation. Said another: "From an NGO's perspective, the rescue was an absolute disaster. What is the FARC going to think now when they interact with us in the field? That act has fundamentally altered our work in Colombia."

"You have to remember that NGOs are constantly under scrutiny," advised an NGO representative. "If one of us jeopardizes his integrity, he may go away forever. You may be put in a hole in the ground. I know someone like that. These things happen every day. We are working in countries that don't have transparent governments in power. We are working in situations where people will do anything to maintain their power." As a consequence, NGOs will often exert pressure if one of their counterparts steps out of line. An NGO representative cited an example where NGOs reported the actions of a peer they felt was compromising the security and integrity of their operations to the donors they shared in common. Only the threat of funding loss reined in the rogue organization.

The idea of working in the same space, yet maintaining separateness, is a difficult issue for the military. Said one officer, "If you [NGOs]

Susan McGregor of Humber College and York University networks with Phillip Rush of the Bonn International Center for Conversion.

are receiving taxpayer dollars or security from my unit; you had better be aware of that. We put our lives at risk on your behalf, so you should cooperate and help us out a little bit." A civil affairs officer posed the question at the heart of the civil-military cooperation debate: "Is it a pipe dream on our part to think that we'll work together?"

> "When an NGO arrives in a country like Sudan or Chad, everyone assumes that you work for the CIA. So you start from a deficit. Calling an NGO a force multiplier can add to that deficit."
>
> **– *NGO Representative***

No, said Poteat, highlighting different ways the military and NGO communities can strengthen cooperation in insecure environments. Chief among them:

- Providing an NGO consultant to military planners to improve coordination in such conflict zones as Afghanistan and Iraq.
- Using NGO online resources such as ReliefWeb, rather than a Department of Defense (DoD) site. Poteat underscored NGO workers' desire to access material freely and openly from an international website that doesn't require passcode access or store user information on a server. ReliefWeb has become the de facto standard for sharing information on complex emergencies and natural disasters.
- Leveraging appropriate intermediaries, such as the UN, USAID, S/CRS, and civil-military operations centers (CMOCs), among others, to facilitate dialogue and resolve issues.
- Embedding the *Guidelines* in defense doctrine, such as the US Army's new guide on stability operations, Field Manual 3-07.
- Distributing the *Guidelines* to all stakeholders, so that S&R practitioners at both the headquarters and field levels are aware of new protocols.
- Helping NGOs craft similar frameworks with other militaries.

To help military personnel at the workshop understand why opportunities for cooperation are necessarily limited, NGO and IGO representatives addressed some of the common misconceptions they face. These include the myth that NGOs are beholden to the US Government or serve as its agents, or that NGO workers segment service populations into "good guys" and "bad guys" and dispense or withhold services accordingly. "That's a little simplistic," acknowledged a military officer. "We recognize that there is a heavy neutral population." Added another, "If we are not meeting local communities' needs, someone else will. And that person could be a rebel commander." ••



Madoua Teko-Folly (left) and Nick Tomb (right) discuss Global Majority's work with its executive director, Cameron Hunter (center). All three are involved with the Monterey-based NGO.

Civil-Military Interaction Guidelines

The *Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments* are available online at: http://www.interaction.org/files.cgi/5896_InterAction_US_Mil_CivMil_Guidelines_July_07_flat.pdf.

Using Negotiation and Mediation Skills Effectively

Instructors:

Dr. Susan Hocevar
Associate Professor
Naval Postgraduate School

Cameron Hunter
Executive Director
Global Majority

Dr. Susan Hocevar and **Cameron Hunter** led training sessions to help participants develop better negotiation and mediation skills. The training culminated with two case studies where participants practiced new skills, first in a two-person negotiation and later in a multi-party negotiation involving stakeholders with competing, even polarizing, interests.

As they work in complex field environments, S&R actors may be called on to facilitate dialogue with other practitioners or intervene between opposing parties. Developing a more sophisticated understanding of critical issues and a fuller palette of skills will help practitioners move beyond positions, or hard-line negotiating stances, to interests. Interests underlie positions and represent what a party truly wants — and why. They may provide opportunities for developing a shared understanding of past grievances, identifying common areas for cooperation, and working towards the effective resolution of conflict issues. As practitioners work with stakeholders representing a wide array of complex, and often shifting priorities, they should be aware that they are attempting to reconcile both the views of those sitting behind the table and other parties who are not present. These peace spoilers may seek to derail the implementation of any final solution if their needs are not considered and addressed.

Two common negotiation strategies are: distributive negotiation, where parties try to claim as large a share of available benefits as possible; and integrative negotiation, where parties seek to increase the total amount of benefits available to participants. In distributive negotiations, participants are often adversarial and seek to wrest concessions from their opponents. Parties will gain power by generating options and BATNAs (the best alternative to a negotiated agreement) and pointing out the flaws of their opponents' alternatives. Agreement is reached when parties can craft a proposal that they believe to be more acceptable than their other alternatives.

With integrative negotiation, participants realize that they are pursuing different, but not necessarily incompatible, goals. As a consequence, they focus on identifying common or complementary goals, strengthening their relationship, and using creativity and effective communication to solve problems. Successful negotiators will focus on discovering compatible interests, striving to leverage a common understanding or goal for greater gains rather than aggressively negotiating positions.

CSRS holds eight events in Monterey, CA, each year to provide S&R actors with an opportunity to share insights and begin crafting new solutions to the challenges they face rebuilding failed states.

Negotiations can be both integrative and distributive, especially when there are multiple issues involved. Parties can "fractionalize" or examine issues in turn, discovering compatible interests and forming and assessing interests, or "bundle" them to deal with multiple issues at once. Issues that can't be resolved should be set aside, to allow parties to build rapport and achieve success with other issues. By emphasizing interests rather than positions, opposing parties will focus attention on critical problems and needs, build awareness and trust, and develop and consider a wider range of solutions that benefit both parties. The true test of a successful negotiation, of course, is whether it can be implemented. As a consequence, the negotiation team should involve all critical stakeholders in designing the solution, rather than handing off an unwieldy and unworkable settlement.

Participants had a chance to strengthen negotiation skills in two different scenarios featuring an array of S&R actors and organizational perspectives.

Dr. Hocevar set up a negotiation scenario for the group: a two-person negotiation between an NGO operations officer and a military officer. The situation: the need to negotiate the movement of supply convoys from a port city to a displaced persons camp through insecure territory. The point of the negotiation was to see if parties with competing priorities could create a solution that preserved humanitarian principles while acknowledging military resource constraints. In breakout groups, participants discussed a wide array of issues including security challenges, information sharing, and the role of local actors. Participants negotiated different solutions such as providing area security and checkpoints, finding alternative driving routes, leveraging local security forces, and creating go and no go criteria for convoy passage. NGO representatives set stringent criteria for sharing information, agreeing to provide security updates, but not sources, if meetings were held in a neutral location.

Participants critiqued the scenario's emphasis on armed escorts, which most NGOs do not use. Instead, they use a community acceptance strategy for security, believing that if communities value NGOs' work, members will protect staff and assets. In addition, they discussed the misconception that civil affairs officers and NGO country directors are direct counterparts. While civil affairs personnel can provide a useful role in facilitating information sharing, they do not have decision making authority, which both country directors and military commanders possess. As a consequence, NGO representatives said they would prefer to negotiate directly with a commanding officer.

US forces are playing a larger role in relief and reconstruction efforts globally, as part of the military's campaign to win "hearts and minds."

Sometimes conflict is too intractable to be solved by face-to-face negotiations and parties will then agree to be facilitated by a neutral third party. Hunter provided a brief overview of mediation, where opposing parties voluntarily agree to work with an intermediary who seeks to explore options and help facilitate the creation of a binding agreement.

Nick Tomb, CSRS Program Coordinator, then facilitated a more complex negotiation exercise, one where OCHA served as the mediator to a diverse group of stakeholders including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, US Army Civil Affairs, the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, and three NGOs. The situation: a meeting to discuss perspectives on provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). The three NGO roles were designed to represent a range of views of civil-military cooperation, from dogmatic independents to more cooperative organizations. Participants were assigned roles that were diametrically opposed to their professional roles. Thus, a military officer became a hard-line NGO leader, and an NGO representative, a civil affairs officer.

Participants discussed how parties' intractable positions, competing organizational priorities, and the absence of critical stakeholders shaped their discussions. Their realizations helped broaden their understanding of others' viewpoints. Said a military officer: "We all kept assuming that we shared the same goals, but that wasn't true." Added another: "I realized it must be quite humiliating for a government official to sit in a meeting like this and accept aid." Meanwhile, an NGO representative playing the military role said, "It was refreshing to play a role that had such clear-cut goals. As an NGO staffer, I never have had that clarity. I always wanted a little bit of multiple things."

> When multiple issues are involved, parties can choose to "fractionalize," or focus on one issue at a time, or "bundle" issues, to drive to a faster resolution.

One reason participants may have had difficulty negotiating ideological divides was the lack of urgency about the issues on the table. Humanitarian crises have a way of crystallizing issues and forcing cooperation, said an IGO member. S&R actors understand the need to cooperate to mobilize resources, target efforts to populations in need, and ensure the safety of their personnel. This same impetus is not present in development or non-hostile environments.

Participants also discussed the nuances of facilitation versus mediation. Organizations such as OCHA and S/CRS

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Using Negotiation continued from page 4

typically serve as coordinators, bringing key parties to the table, but shy away from any activities that could be construed as promoting a particular agenda. One risk these organizations run: creating a cult of personality. "There are certain people who are well-known in our field. Because they are so well-respected, they are effective conveners," said an IGO member. "People will come to meetings because they know that they will get something out of it. But the problem you create is the perception of having an A team and a B team. If you send the B team out, the people start off at a disadvantage and the work is a lot slower."

Participants debated the applicability of mediation principles to all cultures. One described how nomadic tribes negotiate land rights in Sudan, and how host government intervention harmed preexisting agreements. "There are often natural, indigenous ways of resolving conflict," said the NGO participant, "and it may be better to leave those systems in place than impose our standards. Or else we may need to use a lighter touch." In addition, S&R practitioners may operate in environments so degraded that the natural rule of law has broken down and they must rebuild legal systems. In this type of situation, "you have to be careful that you aren't used to game or disrupt the existing structure," said an NGO representative. NGOs typically leverage their local staff to navigate complex milieus, gathering information about critical issues, stakeholders, and socially accepted conflict resolution strategies. However, two other participants also said

> There are often natural, indigenous ways of resolving conflict, and it may be better to leave those systems in place than impose Western standards.

that sometimes it's important to use cultural differences to force change. "Negotiation is dependent on context," said an NGO member, "but there are times when being an ugly American can work to your advantage. You can use your cultural approach to get to the critical issues." However, such an approach should be used delicately, as NGOs remain in countries for years and necessarily should preserve important working relationships with local actors. ••

A New Approach to Preventing and Responding to Conflict

Speaker:

Carl Siebentritt
Director, Active Response Corps
S/CRS

Carl Siebentritt spoke about the US Government's work to strengthen interagency cooperation. Established by Presidential Directive 44, S/CRS suffered years of political limbo and underfunding. With the 2008 budget, S/CRS finally began receiving the necessary funding to achieve its mission of coordinating and leading interagency efforts; harmonizing US Government efforts with US military operations at the planning and implementation phases; and creating a strong civilian response capacity. To develop a unified operating system, S/CRS has developed a three-tiered Interagency Management System (IMS) consisting of a Washington, DC-based interagency decision making body supported by a planning, operations, and resource mobilization secretariat; interagency planners and experts who deploy to military headquarters to help unify civil-military response; and teams of specialized personnel who deploy to the capitals and provinces of failing states to help integrate US Government activities.

S/CRS's Carl Siebentritt spoke about the US Government's innovative efforts to build civilian agency S&R capacity.

> S/CRS was created to integrate the US Government's response to global crises and to create civilian capacity to help failed states rebuild key infrastructures and services.

"With the Active Response Corps, we're turning the PRT model on its head," said Siebentritt. "We're not trying to create a substitute for DART teams. We're focusing on the next phase: two to three years beyond the immediate crisis."

S/CRS has eight interagency partners and received $75 million in the 2008 supplemental US Government budget to fund a 100-person Active Response Corps. With its $249 million budget request for fiscal year 2009, S/CRS hopes to hire 250 personnel for its active component who would be deployable within two to five days; identify a standby reserve of 2000 personnel who would be deployable on 30 to 45 days of notice; and recruit a 2000-person reserve who could deploy within 45 to 90 days. All corps members would temporarily fulfill vital professional roles, such as planning, operations, and management; rule of law; economic recovery; essential services; governance; and the like. Personnel are only mobilized when the IMS determines that a complex emergency requires a whole of government approach. ••

CSRS Programs for S&R Actors

CSRS regularly hosts education workshops for S&R practitioners to deepen their knowledge, broaden their practical skills, and enhance their professional networks. To design highly relevant, cutting-edge curricula, we vet new ideas with the communities we serve and then collaborate with other organizations and subject matter experts to design the right content mix. An overview follows:

Our Themes

- Health and humanitarian affairs
- Institution building and security sector reform
- S&R skills and tools
- Economic recovery
- Maritime and naval issues

Our Format

- Several events a year in Monterey, CA
- Emphasis on cognitive learning and skills development
- 3-5 days in length

Workshops feature:

- Peer presentations
- Guest lectures
- Case studies
- Exercises and simulations
- Networking

Participants include 40-45 S&R practitioners who represent:

- Nongovernmental organizations
- Intergovernmental organizations
- US and international government civilian agencies
- US and international armed forces

Community Dialogue as a Political Stabilization Strategy

Speaker:

Reverend Byron Bland
Associate Director
Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation

So how do negotiation strategies work in countries riven by decades of intractable conflict? **Reverend Bland** presented his perspective on peacebuilding, developed during years of hands-on work with opposing parties in countries such as Northern Ireland or Israel and Palestine.

While negotiation tomes such as *Getting to Yes* present simple strategies for resolving conflict, sometimes they simply don't work, said Bland. Win-win outcomes are only possible if parties can leverage common interests to claim value from the other. Bland's work has focused on helping opposing sides in corrupt, inefficient societies engage in constructive dialogue, build relationships, and broker political deals.

What's critically important is that groups grapple successfully with four consecutive questions:

- **The question of a shared future** – Can each side envision a future for the other that is bearable? And can they align internal stakeholders around that vision? To address this question, opposing parties must establish a political domain and begin building trust.
- **The question of trustworthiness** – Can the parties trust each other to honor commitments? And can each side manage peace spoilers whose interests aren't served by reaching an agreement and might try to wreck it? Both parties should commit to reciprocal unilateral action to build confidence and mask the disagreements that still lie between them.
- **The question of loss acceptanc**e – Can the parties accept necessary losses to make the concessions a settlement will require? Each side must understand and appreciate the other's losses and the corrosive effects of past and current humiliations.
- **The question of just entitlements** – How can parties collaborate to alleviate the worst injustices? There is no way to negotiate a truly just peace; instead opposing sides should work to ensure it is not unbearably unjust.

Reverend Byron Bland, Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation, stressed the importance of facilitated dialogue as a strategy for moving beyond intractable conflict.

To illustrate how these questions influence real-world negotiations, Bland described the negotiations between South African President Frederik Willem de Klerk and Nelson Mandela, a leader of the African National Congress (ANC). De Klerk made numerous concessions, finally agreeing to give every citizen the right to vote and involve the ANC in the political process. Why? Bland said that every time Mandela spoke publicly, he talked about the role of the Afrikaners in South Africa's future. By doing so, Mandela created a vision for the country that Afrikaners could accept.

The goal is not to win over the other side. Each side believes that it sees the world as it is, an ideological stance Bland calls naïve realism. "I have never met anyone participating in one of our dialogues who said, 'I hope I'm changed by this. I hope I find out how wrong I am and how right the other side is,'" said Bland. "Of course everyone wants to believe the other side is wrong. But somewhere in the process, people begin to realize that the views of the other side are indeed authentic." In Northern Ireland, the breakthrough came when Republicans and Nationalists both said they understood why their opponents acted the way they did. In addition, each side acknowledged that had it been in the other's shoes, it might have acted the same way. ••

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put it. Yet overstepping organizational neutrality can compromise the integrity of NGOs' work. The cost can be great, as organizations may lose access to service populations and employees' lives could be put in harm's way. Numerous workshop participants talked about the escalation of attacks on NGO staff and how confusion over local actors' roles can result in swift reprisals against offending organizations. To illuminate and clarify this idea of humanitarian operating space, the OCHA Glossary of Humanitarian Terms states that:

Adherence to the key operating principles of neutrality and impartiality in humanitarian operations represents the critical means, by which the prime objective of ensuring that suffering must be met wherever it is found, can be achieved. Consequently, maintaining a clear distinction between the role and function of humanitarian actors from that of the military is the determining factor in creating an operating environment in which humanitarian organisations can discharge their responsibilities both effectively and safely.[3]

CSRS hosted *Working in the Same Space* to empower S&R practitioners with the insights and skills they need to facilitate the complex negotiations that arise in their work, both within the S&R community, and with local actors, including host governments, indigenous populations, rebel forces, and other stakeholders. Actors work side-by-side in insecure environments, where fluid security conditions often necessitate some degree of cooperation.

Working in the Same Space is just one of the workshops CSRS holds on a regular basis to provide a forum for global actors to engage with one another, discuss S&R challenges, and begin creating new solutions to complex problems. CSRS provides cross-community education across five themes: health and humanitarian affairs, institution building and security sector reform, S&R skills and tools, economic recovery, and maritime and naval issues. "CSRS workshops mix our processes with your perspectives to create an environment where you can acquire new insights and skills and apply them to your work," said Matthew Vaccaro, CSRS Program Director.

Vaccaro began the workshop by giving an overview of the Center's programs and then asking participants to introduce themselves, their organizations, and their work, while offering up some stereotypes about their communities. As S&R actors work together in the field, they often encounter individuals whose organizational perspectives and working styles conflict or compete with their own. As a consequence, it can be tempting to generalize cross-cultural others, short-circuiting the development of cooperative working relationships. What's critical is to use new insights to update one's perceptions on an ongoing basis. (See *Tools for Cross-Cultural Understanding* for more information on how deepening cultural fluency can help S&R practitioners address the needs and motivations of diverse stakeholders in conflict and crisis situations.)

> "Some stereotypes are partially true. I am a tree hugger, but I don't wear Birkenstocks. Why? You can't run in them." ***— NGO Representative***

Four panelists, representing the major communities who participate in S&R work, shared their organizational priorities and perspectives on working side-by-side in post-conflict environments.



S&R actors share perspectives gained from working in insecure environments around the world.

The Armed Forces

LtCol Bob Baird offered his personal perspective on the armed forces. Although the men and women of the armed forces wear similar uniforms, they represent very different cultures. An organization as vast as the US Army has multiple subcultures such as light infantry or armored combat units, each of which possesses its own operational focus and expertise. The US Marines, on the other hand, is a smaller fighting force with a more consistent organizational structure and culture.

Military unit leaders acquire enormous responsibility early in their careers. A young captain, five or six years out of college, may have responsibility for 120 soldiers, overseeing everything from career development, to deployments, to discipline. As a lieutenant colonel, that same officer would have responsibility for 1000-1500 soldiers. "We give our commanders authority over life and death, over when to shoot and when not to," said LtCol Baird.

The military is in the process of a vast cultural change, due to its move into relief and infrastructure development

(Continued on page 7)

[3] Ibid.

Introduction continued from page 6

CSRS events provide S&R actors with an excellent opportunity to strengthen their cross-community professional networks.

work. "Other S&R actors can't be commanded as support agencies," acknowledged LtCol Baird. Civil affairs personnel act as cultural interpreters for the line units, serving as intermediaries to facilitate information sharing and cooperation, while protecting NGO independence. LtCol Baird cited some of the issues impeding effective cooperation with other players: short field deployments, limited resources, and an exclusive focus on accomplishing the mission.

From a *Full Metal Jacket*, to *Jarhead*, *A Few Good Men*, and *Rambo*, civilians learn their stereotypes of the US military from the movies. There is some truth to these stereotypes, acknowledged LtCol Baird. "I have met some Colonel Jesseps, like the character in *A Few Good Men*, but that's because the US military and especially the Marine Corps look for aggressive leaders. We don't necessarily promote and reward those who simply collaborate and build teams. Our culture can make it difficult to play in the sandbox with others," he said. Nonetheless, DoD realizes that it needs to implement a whole of government approach to address the world's reconstruction challenges. As a consequence, DoD is committed to institutionalizing organizational change.

Nongovernmental Organizations

In contrast to the US military, the NGO community is not well-organized, said **InterAction's Linda Poteat**. NGOs operate by building consensus on critical issues to coordinate response work, increase effectiveness, and agree on standards.

As a community, NGOs are governed by humanitarian principles — neutrality, impartiality, and independence. However, the community is extremely diverse, with NGOs varying considerably in size, mission, geographic focus, and expertise. "We have NGOs who have been working on water and sanitation in Africa for 20 years," said Poteat, "and we have others who bring in volunteers with a specific technical skill for just two weeks." In addition, most NGOs are heavily localized, with the preponderance of staff coming from the geographies in which they work. "We have a long-term vision for our work. Many NGOs stay on the ground for many years. As a consequence, our relationships are absolutely vital: They open doors for our staff and have a huge impact on how we operate after a crisis," said Poteat.

> "The US military looks for aggressive leaders. We don't necessarily promote and reward those who simply collaborate and build teams. Our culture can make it difficult to play in the sandbox with others."
>
> — ***LtCol Bob Baird, US Marine Corps***

By focusing on serving victims of conflicts and natural disasters, "we have a lot of job security," said Poteat. NGOs will often broaden their reach to gain new funding, by responding to a natural disaster where they have a country team in place or focusing on emerging priorities for the US and international government, among other strategies. While NGOs are adept at raising money, they also have a stringent sense of accountability, reporting regularly to donors and members about how money was raised and spent.

Intergovernmental Organizations

OCHA's Michael Marx offered a primer on the UN system, the different agencies, and their areas of focus. "All have their own objectives and agendas," Marx said. The UN's humanitarian actors work through consensus, using the Inter-Agency Standing Committee to promote global dialogue and make binding decisions for the humanitarian community, Marx noted. Its members include such groups as the World Food Program, the UN Children's Fund, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and the World Health Organization, as well as major international NGO consortia and the Red Cross/ Red Crescent Movement.

In the UN community, most decision making is decentralized. "If you can raise funds for a project, you can probably do it," said Marx. "But it doesn't happen quickly. There's typically a lot of back and forth with donors." The UN will usually serve as the middleman for these initiatives, funneling funding to the NGOs which implement about 85% of UN programs.

As a civil-military advisor for OCHA, Marx helps coordinate humanitarian action with the full sphere of national and international actors, including UN agencies, international NGOs, host governments, donor governments, the Red Cross, and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The donors have an incredible amount of power: setting priorities, funding work, and coordinating recipients' activities. The work is personality-based, said Marx, and players often leverage long-term relationships to mobilize support and resources.

NGOs' humanitarian principles dictate their organizational priorities and govern worker behavior. As such, the UN and NGOs often find their motives conflict with those of the military. "The US military will say that they are doing something to win hearts and minds. That is not our perspective. We believe that the principles you use on the ground are absolutely critical, and that in the long-term, motives are sometimes as important as the results," said Marx.

Government Civilian Agencies

Like the other speakers, **Larry Sampler of S/CRS**, cautioned against considering the US Government as a cohesive entity. "DoD and State are incredibly different. The military is command-and-control-driven, while State is consensus-driven," he said. These differences are reflected in the organizations' language. "We use acronyms that make our heads spin," said Sampler. "We've got to create a vocabulary we can share. Words govern our actions." S&R practitioners fall into a similar trap when they talk generically about the community they represent. "Who do we mean, when we say 'we?' I defy you to define a coherent international community. We have different organizations and different priorities." However, Sampler added that civilian government representatives need to avoid leading with their organizations' positions which can impair efforts to create effective interagency response; instead they should focus on shared objectives.

> "Forums like ***Working in the Same Space*** are incredibly valuable. CSRS ensures that speakers and participants represent a wide array of S&R actors."
>
> — ***Larry Sampler, S/CRS***

One of the challenges actors face in the field is understanding how the concept of impartiality affects others' actions. NGOs seek to alleviate suffering, knowing that relief could potentially be diverted to those individuals responsible for perpetrating violence. This ideological stance is foreign to military personnel.

Participants discussed examples as various as Colombia, Palestine, North Korea, and Sri Lanka, where aiding populations in need may involve passing monies through host governments or rebel hands. Said a participant, "It is absolutely naïve to think that US Government money is not going to 'bad guys.' Congress has rules that money doesn't go to terrorist states, but that goes against directives that the US provides money based on need." In such situations, military and humanitarian objectives necessarily conflict, as military forces focus on achieving a political objective, whereas NGOs seek to solve long-term issues and help local populations. "We have no stake in who is in charge as long as leaders follow international law," said Poteat.

The military's increasing incursion into relief has come at a cost to NGOs. "How can villagers differentiate between the military and humanitarian groups?" asked Marx. "A villager may not care who is giving aid, but over time it does make a difference. There is guilt by association. NGOs have always been a target, but not to the extent that they are now. In Somalia, they are taking out people by name," Marx added.

Participants used breakout groups to plan their negotiation strategies for workshop simulations.

Tom Baltazar of USAID spoke about his office's work to manage the agency's day-to-day relationship with DoD on areas of common interest including humanitarian assistance, terrorism prevention, conflict prevention and assistance, counter-insurgency, stabilization and reconstruction, and operational activities. A branch of the Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau, the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) seeks to facilitate a whole of government response to complex crises by synchronizing joint planning activities, designing and holding training exercises and conferences, and managing interagency communications. In addition, OMA provides combatant command liaison officers to several military commands to strengthen the USAID-DoD relationship and provide access to the right decision makers. OMA's work is guided by Section 1207 of the Defense Authorization Act, which provides agencies with funding for agency S&R and security initiatives and USAID's civil-military cooperation policy, which defines how government civilian agencies and the US military will collaborate and share information. ••

S&R Community Stereotypes

Participants introduced themselves by describing their organizations and professional roles. In addition, they offered up humorous stereotypes about their communities. Some of these stereotypes reflect real issues, while others simply reflect other actors' and individuals' misperceptions about organizational missions and work methods.

NGOs

- Naive do-gooders.
- Tree huggers.
- Disorganized cat herders.
- Anti-military peaceniks.

IGO

- Overly bureaucratic and inefficient.
- Politically indecisive.
- Life by committee.
- Trying to take over the world.

Education

- Wonkish, absent-minded professors.
- Live in an ivory tower.
- Inept, as in the old adage: "Those who can, do. Those who can't, teach."

Government Civilian Agency

- Ascot-wearers who can't make decisions.
- Ineffective and totally unaware of it.
- Absent or stuck in the embassy.
- Life by process.

Armed Forces

- Baby-killing warmongers.
- Civil Affairs personnel who hand out toys and drill wells.
- Short-timers who get in and get out.
- Secretive.
- Good at getting things done; civilians just muddle around.

The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies

The **Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies** (CSRS) is a teaching institute which develops and hosts educational programs for stabilization and reconstruction practitioners, including representatives from US and international nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, government and civilian agencies, and the armed forces. Established by the Naval Postgraduate School in 2004 through the vision and congressional support of Representative Sam Farr (CA-17), CSRS creates a wide array of programs to foster dialogue among practitioners, as well as to help them develop new strategies and refine best practices to improve the effectiveness of their important global work.

Located at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, CSRS also contributes to the university's research and graduate degree programs. For more information about CSRS, its philosophy, and programs, please visit **www.csrs-nps.org**.

Organizational Participants

- **Bonn International Center for Conversion**
- **Global Majority**
- **Institute for State Effectiveness**
- **InterAction**
- **Mercy Corps**
- **The National, CBC Television**
- **Naval Postgraduate School**
- **Pearson Peacekeeping Centre**
- **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs**
- **US Agency for International Development**
- **US Army**
- **US Department of Defense**
- **US Department of Health and Human Services**
- **US Department of State**
- **US Marine Corps**
- **US Navy**
- **US Pacific Command**
- **US Special Operations Command**
- **University of California at Berkeley**
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